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The use of escort and reaction forces in defending road
transport convoys against ambushes is described by two models
which comprise a planning models A single-server queueing
model with Poisson arrivals and a general service time dis-
tribution is used to develop a measure of the utilization of
the escort and reaction forces, A combat attrition model of
guerrilla warfare and a probability distribution of ambush
locations are used to derive the service time distribution
for the queueing model. Suggested uses for the planning
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SUMMARY
Lines of communication in an insurgent environment are
vulnerable to guerrilla ambushes. One method of vehicle con-
voy defense against an ambush is an escort force accompany-
ing the convoy together with a reaction force available to
assist the escort force in the event of an ambush. Because
the reaction force does not accompany the convoy there is a
delay in the arrival of the reaction force at the ambush
site. A problem arises when decisions must be made concern-
ing escort and reaction force sizes, the tolerable delay in
reaction force arrival, and the size of the reaction force's
area of responsibility.
Two models are proposed to analytically describe the
escort and reaction force relationship and thereby provide
a planning model to assist the decision-maker in solving his
problem. A single-server queueing model is used to determine
a measure of escort and reaction force utilization in the
form of probabilities that the reaction force is idle, busy,
or busy while additional ambushes occur. Poisson arrivals
of the event, the ambush of a convoy, are assumed with the
parameter of the distribution a function of both the number
of convoys in the area of interest and a fixed probability
of ambush of each convoy. A combat attrition model of guer-
rilla warfare and a probability distribution of ambush loca-
tions are used to derive a service time distribution for the
queueing model. The combat attrition model also predicts the




Lines of communication in an insurgent environment are
vulnerable to guerrilla ambushes. One method of vehicle con-
voy defense against an ambush is an escort force accompany-
ing the convoy together with a reaction force available to
assist the escort force in the event of an ambush. Because
the reaction force does not accompany the convoy there is a
delay in the arrival of the reaction force at the ambush
site. A problem arises when decisions must be made concern-
ing escort and reaction force sizes, the tolerable delay in
reaction force arrival, and the size of the reaction force's
area of responsibility.
Two models are proposed to analytically describe the
escort and reaction force relationship and thereby provide
a planning model to assist the decision-maker in solving his
problem. A single-server queueing model is used to determine
a measure of escort and reaction force utilization in the
form of probabilities that the reaction force is idle, busy,
or busy while additional ambushes occur. Poisson arrivals
of the event, the ambush of a convoy, are assumed with the
parameter of the distribution a function of both the number
of convoys in the area of interest and a fixed probability
of ambush of each convoy. A combat attrition model of guer-
rilla warfare and a probability distribution of ambush loca-
tions are used to derive a service time distribution for the
queueing model. The combat attrition model also predicts the
escort and reaction force sizes necessary to defeat a given
guerrilla ambush.
The thesis shows that the escort and reaction force
relationship can be modelled, and provides a planning model
permitting a general simulation of the escort and reaction
force part of the convoy defense problem, A cost-effective-
ness study of convoy defense could also be based upon it.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
"Rapidity is the essence of war, take
advantage of the enemy's unreadiness,
make your way by unexpected routes
,
and attack unguarded spots."
Sun Tzu, The Arts of War - 500 B.C.
One of the basic tactics of a numerically inferior force
is avoiding an engagement until the force is certain that it
has an overwhelming local superiority in firepower. When the
force has achieved that superiority it attacks to gain the
decisive advantage before the opposing force can react.
Guerrilla warfare is a type of warfare in which many
excellent examples of the concept of mobility of forces may
be found. The guerrillas attempt to overcome their lack of
over-all numerical superiority by emphasizing mobility of
forces in order to concentrate their forces at existing weak
points of a numerically superior enemy. Ambushes, partic-
ularly ambushes of road transport convoys, are examples of
this use of mobility to gain local superiority in numbers and
firepower. An ambush is an unexpected attack on an enemy
made from a hidden place. Since guerrillas are usually able
to move freely throughout the combat zone they may and do use
the ambush to interdict lines of communication and suoply
routes. This thesis is directed toward a portion of the
route security problem, the defense of road transport con-
voys .
The route security problem is not new, just as guerrilla
warfare is not new. The problem has existed to varying
degrees in almost every conflict in which the armies had
to maintain lines of communication.
Among the possible methods of convoy defense against am-
bush is an escort force accompanying the convoy. The escort
force is an example of the self-defense strategy. Since the
escort force may not be able to defeat every ambush a reac-
tion force may be available at some base area to assist the
escort force in the event of an ambush. The reaction force
is an example of the reaction strategy. During the German
occupation of Greece in World War II the German army was able
to keep the Greek guerrilla forces off balance in part by
their prompt reaction to all guerrilla actions. [14] U.S.
Army and Marine Corps tactical doctrine states that reaction
forces should be available to react to guerrilla-initiated
actions, such as ambushes. [8, 23, 21, 20] Because the reac-
tion force does not accompany the escort force there will be
some delay encountered in the arrival of the reaction force
at the ambush site should an ambush occur.
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a planning
model to mathematically describe the escort and reaction
force relationship in the convoy defense problem. The plan-
ning model will consist of two basic models; a model of the
convoy ambush, and an escort and reaction force utilization
model. The convoy ambush model will describe the combat
losses of the engaged forces and the length of time required
to reduce the size of one force or the other to zero. The
escort and reaction force utilization model will measure the
utilization of forces in the form of probabilities that the
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reaction force is waiting in readiness to respond to an am-
bush, busy assisting an ambushed convoy, or busy assisting
an ambushed convoy while additional ambushes occur.
The subject of this thesis was suggested by Major R.P.
Rogers in his earlier research in the area of route security
[16] This thesis extends his work.
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CHAPTER II
THE AMBUSH OF ROAD TRANSPORT CONVOYS
A review of the literature describing the ambush of road
transport convoys suggests a recurring pattern in this form
of attack by guerrillas. Military Assistance Advisory Group,
Vietnam Lessons Learned Number 15 lists seven military
characteristics of guerrilla ambushes. [10] Some of these
characteristics are:
adequate intelligence collection by the guerrillas;
I
careful site selection;
complete security of the ambush site until the
ambush itself is "sprung";
detailed planning of the ambush; and
short intense actions followed by complete and
rapid withdrawal.
Two books by Bernard B. Fall as well as U. S. Army and Marine
Corps publications on lessons learned in Vietnam contain des-
criptions of convoy ambushes. [6, 7, 22, 25] The essential
elements of the guerrilla ambushes described agree in general
with the military characteristics listed above.
The intelligence that the guerrillas require includes
knowledge of routes, composition and time of arrival of the
target to be ambushed, and weapons and defensive troops which
accompany the target. Without intelligence the guerrilla
force cannot effectively plan and prepare an ambush. Without
planning and preparation the risks to the ambushing force
become unacceptable by guerrilla standards. If it appears
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that the ambush cannot be successfully completed it will not
in general be attempted.
Careful selection and preparation of the ambush site by
the guerrillas will give them a decided advantage and place
the convoy in an unfavorable position when ambushed. Al-
though the presence of high ground to one or both sides of
the road is usually preferred to establish fields of fire,
this is not a necessary condition for an ambush. Likewise,
the crest of a hill or a bend in the road which hides the
head of a convoy from the elements in the rear is also pre-
ferred though not essential. Ambushes have been reported
which took place on roads through open fields with a seeming-
ly minimum amount of cover. [7] The guerrilla deliberately
varies the selection of ambush sites in an effort to avoid
producing a predictable pattern. [25]
The guerrillas must have well-concealed firing positions
to prevent premature discovery of the ambush site by a rou-
tine patrol or aerial reconnaissance and thus lose the
element of surprise. In addition the concealed positions
will present a difficult target to the convoy defenders once
the ambush firing has begun. Part of the preparation of the
ambush site may include a road-block, a command-detonated
mine, or some other mechanism positioned to insure that the
convoy must stop and cannot drive through the ambush when
the firing begins. The guerrillas must also insure that their
weapon's fields of fire cover the area where the convoy will
be stopped. The guerrilla withdrawal route should be known
to the guerrillas in advance. Secondary ambushes and snipers
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may then be positioned along this route to defend against
possible reinforcement of the convoy and to cover the with-
drawal of the main ambush force.
Extensive preparation of the ambush site makes it pos-
sible for the guerrilla to maintain positions of readiness
at the ambush site for extended periods of time without detec-
tion. Thus a guerrilla force may choose not to ambush a con-
voy if it sees that the escort force is large enough to make
victory uncertain for the guerrillas. As long as "the ambush
site remains undetected it may be reoccupied and used at a
later time when the guerrilla force is larger or the escort
force smaller.
The tactics of the ambushers will vary depending on the
guerrilla objective and the convoy defense. In general, the
ambush begins with the attempted stopping of the convoy at
a predetermined point. Almost simultaneously a very heavy
concentration of fire is established by the guerrillas into
areas at both ends of the convoy, or at the head and center
of the convoy. The purpose of this heavy volume of fire is
to inflict heavy casualties on those defenders in the killing
zone while the ambushed unit is still unorganized. The am-
bushers usually attempt to extend this killing zone to in-
clude the whole convoy in order to annihilate the escort
forces. On a predetermined signal, the ambushers will attempt
to break contact and withdraw from the ambush site.
The advantage the guerrilla force has will be generally
lost as the ambushed force is able to reorganize, mount an
effective defense, and summon a reaction force.
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The exposed position of trucks on the road and the
concealment and surprise of the ambushers make ambushes of
road transport convoys difficult to counter or defend against.
One means of defense, foot patrols moving along the side of
the road to detect the ambush prior to the arrival of the
convoy, causes the convoy to move much more slowly than usual
in order to remain behind the foot patrols. The concealment
of firing positions and the use of command-detonated mines,
instead of a road-block, to stop the convoy make airborne
detection of ambush sites very difficult. The presence of
aircraft over the convoy tends to discourage ambushes but
poor flying conditions and limited aircraft availability some-
times causes air cover to be unavailable. [15]
Another means of convoy defense, a reaction force, may
be called on to assist the escort force. The reaction force
would probably not join the escort force but would instead
attack the guerrilla force on its flanks and rear. Since
the reaction force does not accompany the convoy there will
be some delay in its arrival at the ambush site. From the
convoy defender's point of view the ambush may be divided
into two phases. The first phase begins when firing commences
and lasts until either the reaction force arrives or one side
wins the engagement. The second phase begins with the arrival
of the reaction force and lasts until one side wins.
In the following chapter a mathematical model of convoy
ambushes will be developed. The model will divide the con-
voy into two phases. Phase one models the escort-guerrilla
15
engagement prior to the arrival of the- reaction force. Phase
two models the engagement after the reaction force arrives.
16
CHAPTER III
A MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF CONVOY AMBUSHES
The development of a mathematical model of convoy am-
bushes will begin with the basic Lanchester equations of com-
bat. [13] Modifications of the Lanchester equations sug-
gested by Deitchman to model the ambush situation will be
shown. [5] A generalization of Deitchman 's model proposed
by Schaffer will be used to model the convoy ambush situation
before and after the arrival of the reaction force. [19]
Lanchester 's Equations of Combat
Lanchester was the first to attempt to describe mathe-
matically the effects of concentration of forces on the
outcome of a battle. His formulation of the "n-square law"
modeled the ability of an individual rifleman to fire at many
of the enemy at one time, and hypothesized that the attrition
dr
of a "red" force per unit time,
-Tr, is directly proportional
to the numerical strength, b, of the opposing "blue" force,
and vice versa. Mathematically, the attrition rates for the
two forces are
i=-cr (1)
and ^r = - k b (2)dt
where t is the time since the beginning of the battle and
c and k are the attrition coefficients of the "red" and
"blue" forces respectively, reflecting the ability of each
force to inflict casualties on the opposing force. The
solution to these simultaneous differential equations yields
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the result that the opposing forces will be reduced to zero
at the same time when the square of their initial numerical
strengths, rQ , b Q/ multiplied by their attrition coefficients




= k b Q
2
(3)
In the case where the opposing sides are not visible
to each other, each rifleman is assumed to fire into the
area he believes the opposing force occupies. This results
in an attrition of "red" force per unit time proportional
to the number of the "red" riflemen firing and the number of
the "blue" riflemen occupying the area into which "red"
riflemen are firing, and vice versa. Thus for area fire,
the attrition rates for the two forces are
§--=br (*>
and
f£- - k r b (5)
The solution to the equations in this case yields the result
that the opposing forces will be reduced to zero at the same
time when the initial numerical strength of each force is





This form of combat model is called the Lanchester linear law
Deitchman's Ambush Model
In an ambush situation the ambush force, or guerrillas,
fire at the ambushed force from concealed positions while
the ambushed force is in full view of the guerrillas. The
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ambushed force, in defending itself, fires where it thinks
the enemy is located, that is, into the area that the ambushed
force believes the guerrillas occupy. Deitchman has proposed
a mixed linear-square law case for ambushes in which the
guerrilla's ability to inflict casualties on the ambushed
force follows the n-square law while the ambushed force's
ability to inflict casualties on the guerrillas follows the
linear law. The attrition of the ambushed force of size E
dEper unit time, -^r-, is proportional to the numerical strength,
G, of the guerrillas, while the attrition of the guerrilla
force of size G per unit time, -rr-, is proportional to the
number of the ambushed force firing and the number of guer-





where t is the time since the ambush began and B and A are
the guerrilla and the ambushed force's attrition coefficients
respectively. The attrition coefficient of the ambushed
force, A, is the rate at which a single rifleman in the am-
bushed force kills guerrillas, and may be considered to be
the product of the rate of fire of each of the ambushed
force's weapons, r f , and the probability that each round
fired produces a casualty. The single round casualty prob-
ability may be thought of as the ratio of the area of a tar-
get which would produce a casualty, A , to the total area in
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which the target is located, A . Then
A
-fT • (9 >
g
The guerrilla force's attrition coefficient may be the prod-
uct of the rate of fire of each of the guerrilla's weapons,
r , and the single shot kill probability of each of the
guerrilla's weapons in direct fire, P . That is,
y
B = r P . (10)
g g
The solution to the differential equations gives the
condition which results in the reduction of both forces to
zero at the same time. That condition is




where G Q and E Q are the initial guerrilla and ambushed force
sizes respectively.
This combat model taken into account the advantage of
concealment that the guerrilla force has over the ambushed
force. The simultaneous differential equations can be solved
explicitly making possible the calculation of the force sizes
of the two sides at any time after the beginning of the am-
bush if the appropriate initial force sizes and attrition
coefficients are known.
It can be seen from the form of equations (9) and (10)
that tne attrition coefficients do not vary with time. This
implies that the ambushed force remains in full view of the
guerrillas throughout the ambush. It also implies that
during the ambush the ambushed force does not improve its
knowledge of the location of the guerrillas.
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The tactical doctrine of the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine
Corps, and the Australian Army emphasizes the immediate ac-
tion drill, or contact drill, in which troops in vehicles
are taught the most expeditious method of dismounting and
attaining cover. [1, 23, 24, 10] The doctrine also urges
development of a counterattack by those forces not in the
killing zone to assist those forces pinned down by the in-
tense guerrilla fire into the killing zone. Thus it seems
unrealistic to assume that the ambushed force would not im-
prove its initial position and firing effectiveness over the
course of the engagement.
Schaffer's Ambush Model
The model proposed by Schaffer allows the ambushed force
to take cover and to pinpoint the guerrilla force after the
ambush has started. The changes in the ambushed force's
situation during the ambush is modeled by the introduction
of time-dependent weapon^ efficiency coefficients and sup-
porting weapon's effects. Weapon's efficiency coefficients
reflect the effectiveness of the small arms fire of the force
This model can £>e applied to either skirmish or ambush sit-
uations with the use of the appropriate form of weanon's
efficiency coefficients.
In the development of the convoy ambush model which
follows Schaffer's equations will be used and modified as





The convoy ambush model developed in this section in-
cludes only the effects directly attributable to infantry.
The use of supporting artillery is recognized as a valuable
weapon in defeating or preventing ambushes, but was deleted
as a simplifying assumption. Additional simplifying assump-
tions are that no surrenders or desertions take place on
either side, and that only the guerrillas have the option to
withdraw by virtue of their advantage of position and con-
cealment. The resulting ambush equations are as follows:
dE
The attrition rate of the ambushed force,
-^r, is
proportional to the product of the time-dependent weapon's
efficiency coefficient of the guerrilla force, k (t) , and
y
the number of guerrillas firing, G. That is
||= - kg (t) G (12)
The guerrilla weapon's efficiency coefficient, k (t) , may
y
be thought of as a rate at which each guerrilla can produce
ambushed force casualties. The probability that a single
guerrilla round hits the target is given by the ratio of the
presented target area of an individual in the ambushed force
which lies within the area through which the guerrilla round
will pass, A^(t), to the area through which the guerrilla
round will pass. If a single round fired by guerrilla has
a radial dispersion of a , then the area of the circle
g
2through which the round will pass is given by 2i\a . Thus








produces a casualty is given by the product of the probability
that a single round strikes the target and the conditional
probability, PHK / that the round produces a casualty, given
that it hits the target. Thus the rate at which a guerrilla
can produce casualties is given by the product of the number
of rounds per minute that he fires, r , and the probability
that each round produces a casualty. Thus the guerrilla
weapon's efficiency coefficient is
r P A (t)
k (t) = 3 HV . (13)g 2-rrag^
A representation of the change of the target area of a rifle-
man in the ambushed force, to simulate the ability of the
rifleman to take cover, is given by
A (°°)
A.(t) = -, £-7 r qv (14)f 1 - exp(-at -3)
where Af (°°) is the minimum presented area of an individual
in the ambushed force, t, is the time since the ambush began,
a is the constant which determines the rate at which the
individual can take cover, and 3 is the constant which deter-
mines the presented area of the individual at the instant
the ambush begins, (t = 0). Typical values for a and 3 of
6.2 min. and 0.1 respectively imply that the individual
achieves 96% of his eventual cover in 30 seconds and that
initially his oresented area was larger by a factor of ten
over the long term value.
dGIn Schaffer's model the guerrilla attrition rate,
-rr-,
is proportional to the product of the weapon's efficiency co-
efficient of the ambushed force, k f (G,t), and the number of
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riflemen in the ambushed force firing, E. It is also pro-
portional to the product of a withdrawal coefficient, c (t)
,
and the difference between the friendly-guerrilla force ratio
and unity, squared. That is
H = - k f (G, t) E - c (t) (§ - D 2 (15)
The weapon's efficiency coefficient of the ambushed force,
k f (G, t) , changes with time reflecting a change from area to
aimed fire. This coefficient may be reoresented as
k
f
(G, t) = k"(l - exp(-yt)) + k' G exp(-yt) (16)
When t = 0, the coefficient takes the appropriate form for
area fire, k'G. When t is very large, the coefficient takes
the form for aimed fire, k". The constant y in equation (16)
reflects the rate at which the ambusned force can change from
area to aimed fire. A value of 0.102 for y represents the




The term -c (t) (^ - 1) in equation (15) reflects the
y t3
guerrilla force's rate of withdrawal from the ambush site.
The withdrawal coefficient, c (t) , is interpreted as a step
y
function which is dependent on both time and the friendly-
guerrilla force ratio. That is, if the engagement has not
progressed in time to the predetermined point, t , where the
guerrilla force commander decides to withdraw his forces,
then c (t) is set equal to zero and no withdrawal takes place,
g
Similarly, if the battle has progressed beyond the decision
point, but the guerrilla force, G, is numerically superior
to the ambushed force, E, then c (t) remains equal to zero
y
24
and no withdrawal takes place. It is only when the battle
has progressed beyond the decision point and the guerrilla
force is numerically inferior to the ambushed force that
the withdrawal coefficient, c (t) , is allowed to take a pos-
itive value which reflects the rate at which the guerrillas
E 2
withdraw from the battle. The second factor, (77 - 1) , in
E 2
the term -c (t) (^-1) reflects the increase in withdrawal
g G
rate as the guerrilla force becomes increasingly outnumbered.
Since c (t) is zero for friendly-guerrilla force ratios
E 2less tnan unity, the constant, 1, in the expression (— -1)
could be changed to reflect a change in guerrilla tactics.
If the guerrilla force attempted to withdraw very quickly as
soon as they were outnumbered, the constant could be set to
zero to reflect this tactic. Larger values could be assigned
to the constant to reflect a greater delay in guerrilla with-
drawal until the friendly-guerrilla force ratio exceeded the
constant value.
The differential equations presented in this section will
be used to model tne convoy ambush situation until the arrival
of the reaction force.
Combined Escort-Reaction Force Ambush Model
When the reaction force arrives at the ambush site it
will usually attempt to relieve the pressure on the escort
force by attacking the flanks or rear of the guerrilla force.
This tactic will also serve to cut off the guerrilla force
withdrawal route. For the purposes of the model it will be
assumed that the reaction force is not ambushed as it moves
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to engage the guerrillas and that the reaction force has some
information about the location of the guerrilla force. Thus
the reaction force may be assumed to be using aimed fire.
Consistent with the basic assumptions of Lancnester's equa-
tions, the reaction force is taken under fire by the whole
of the guerrilla force , which also continues to fire on the
escort force. Thus the attrition rate of a reaction force
of size RF is proportional to the steady-state weapons effi-
ciency coefficient of the guerrilla force, k , arid the number
y
of guerrillas firing, G, yielding
IF - - V • (17)
The rate of attrition of the guerrilla force is increased
by the reaction force, that increase being proportional to
the product of the weapon's efficiency coefficient of the re-
action force, k ,., and the number of the reaction force fir-
rf
ing , RF. The weapon's efficiency coefficient of the reaction
force may Pe considered to be the same as the steady state
escort force weapons efficiency. This implies that the reac-
tion force is able to locate the guerrillas with the assist-
ance of the escort force and does not have to go through the
same phases of surprise and reorganization that the escort
force underwent
-
A change in the friendly-guerrilla force ratio should
also be made to reflect the arrival of the reaction force.
Thus the attrition per unit time of all friendly elements en-
gaged after the arrival of the reaction force is given by




= - k G . (19)dt g
The attrition of the guerrilla force per unit time is given
by




The attrition per unit time of the escort and reaction forces
has been expressed separately to permit flexibility in the
model. These two units would probably act as separate units
in battle and the reaction force would probably attempt to
out-flank the guerrilla force or surround them and thus would
not encounter exactly the same conditions as the escort force.
Also a change in the weapon's efficiency of either force
would not affect the other.
The differential equations developed in tnis section will
be used to model the convoy ambush situation after the arrival
of the reaction force.
Convoy Ambush Model Results
The solution to the simultaneous differential equations
developed in the last two sections may be solved on a digital
computer. A computer program was written to solve the dif-
ferential equations using a Runge-Kutta fourth order numer-
ical integration technique. (See Appendix A) Two routines
were used in tne computer program, one to generate a solution
to the equations prior to the arrival of the reaction force,
and the other to generate a solution after the arrival of the
reaction force.
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Inputs to the computer program were the initial escort,
reaction, and guerrilla force sizes; the weapon's efficien-
cies of the guerrilla and reaction forces; the weapon's
efficiencies of the escort force for area and aimed fire; the
coefficients reflecting the rate at which the escort force
can take cover; the coefficient reflecting the rate of achiev-
ing aimed fire by the escort force; the withdrawal coefficient
and the time at which the guerrilla force would begin to with-
draw if outnumbered; and the time after the beginning of the
ambush at which the reaction force arrived. The step size
for the numerical integration technique and the increment by
which the reaction time is increased are also inputs.
The logic of the program was to find a solution to the
escort and guerrilla ambush equations up to the time of arriv-
al of the reaction force (reaction time). If either side's
forces were reduced to zero prior to reaction time the pro-
gram printed out the time required to reduce the one side to
zero, the numerical strength of the winning side at the end
of the engagement; and then stopped. If neither side had won
at reaction time, the force sizes and reaction time were
printed out and the program solved the equations for escort,
reaction and guerrilla forces. The numerical integration
stopped when either the guerrilla force or the escort and
reaction force was reduced to zero. The final strength of
the forces was then printed out along with the total time
or duration of the ambush.
The program was used to examine the effect of changes
in reaction time on the outcome of the ambush. The effect
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of changes in total friendly force sizes, escort-reaction
force ratios and guerrilla force size were also examined.
The numerical values used in the program are included in Ap-
pendix A. The input values of variables which were not ex-
amined in the program were chosen to agree with those used
by Schaffer and should not be construed to reflect actual
combat data. [19]
The output of the computer ambush model has been plotted
to illustrate part of the type of information which the model
may generate. Figure 1 shows a plot of total ambush time as
a function of reaction time for fixed total friendly and
guerrilla force sizes and for various escort-reaction force
ratios. It can be seen that in general total ambush time
increases as reaction time increases until a point is reached
at which the ambush is over before the reaction force arrives.
Of special interest are those curves which show that the es-
cort force could not win without the help of tne reaction
force. The curves show, as one might suspect, that as the
escort force size becomes smaller in relation to the guer-
rilla force size there is less time available for the reaction
force to arrive before the escort force is annihilated. This
may be more clearly seen in Figure 2, which shows a plot of
the time required to reduce the escort force to zero as a
function of the initial escort-guerrilla force size ratio.
The fact that the two curves for different guerrilla force
sizes coincide suggests that the ambush duration without the
reaction force may be independent of the magnitude of tne
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on their relative magnitudes expressed as a ratio. Additional
graphs are included in Appendix B which show total ambush
time as a function of reaction time with an initial guerrilla
force size of 80 riflemen and various initial total friendly
force sizes. In general they exhibit the same total ambush
time reaction time relationship as does Figure 1.
Figure 3 shows the ratio of initial total friendly force
size to fixed initial guerrilla force size as a function of
the ratio of initial escort force size to reaction force size.
On Figure 3 regions are defined in which the guerrilla always
wins or the friendly forces always win depending on the values
of the two ratios used to draw the Figure. The gray region
between the two regions already defined is the region in which
the outcome is dependent on the reaction time of the reaction
force
.
In the next chapter the time required for the reaction
force to arrive at the ambush site will be examined from the
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CHAPTER IV
THE MOBILITY REQUIREMENT FOR REACTION FORCES
As was mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the strategies
which may be used in defending convoys against ambushes is
the reaction strategy. When employing the reaction strategy
the reaction force must move from its base to the ambush site.
A prolonged delay by the reaction force may result in the
annihilation of the escort force prior to the arrival of the
reaction force. The important factors influencing the reac-
tion force's delay will be investigated in this chapter.
The reaction strategy is highly dependent on mobility
of forces. The primary reason for the existence of a reaction
strateqy is to take maximum advantage of a situation where
the guerrilla's position and identity are known.
The requirement for mobility in the reaction strategy
exists as long as the position and identity of the guerrilla
is known. This time interval, during which reaction mobility
is required, is a combination of three factors. These fac-
tors are:
the amount of early warning of impendinc? attack;
the length of time it takes for the guerrilla to
achieve his objective; and
the time required for the guerrilla to withdraw
from the scene of the attack.
Thus the time, t , available to the reaction force to take
a
advantage of the situation by engaging tne enemy before he




a " S, + H + *r <21)
where
t = early warning time,
t. = target life, or attack duration, and
t = guerrilla withdrawal time.
The problem may be simplified by omitting early warning
time since it cannot be estimated in the same manner as tar-
get life. The guerrilla withdrawal time is dependent upon
the specific objective of the guerrilla force. In the case
of the ambush of road transport the objective of the guerrilla
may be to annihiliate the escort force, capture or destroy
equipment, lure a reaction force into another ambush, or
any combination of the above. These objectives cannot be
easily measured in time. Therefore, the time available to
the reaction force to engage the guerrilla force will be con-
sidered as consisting of that time interval during which the
guerrilla force is in contact with the defending escort force.
As modeled in Chapter 3, the time during which the guerilla
force is in contact with the escort force includes guerilla
withdrawal time independent of any guerrilla objective. This
target life time interval then becomes the mobility require-
ment for the reaction force, in that the reaction force must
arrive at the ambush site prior to guerrilla withdrawal.
Some factors which influence the duration of target life have
been examined in Chapter 3.
Within the limitation of the target life and equivalently
,
the time available to the reaction force to engage the
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guerrilla force, several other tasks must be completed before
the reaction force can engaqe the enemy. These include:
Communicating to the reaction force the fact that
an ambush has occurred.
The evaluation of the ambush by the reaction force
command resulting in a decision to react and the
allocation of the reaction force.
The preparation of the reaction force for departure.
The movement of the reaction force from its base
location to the ambush site.
From the above the reaction time, defined as the elapsed
time from the moment the ambush occurs until the reaction
force could engage the guerrilla force, may be derived. Let
t be the length of time required for the escort force to be-
come aware that it has been ambushed, roughly evaluate the
reaction force requirement, and communicate the requirement
to the reaction force base. Let t , be the length of time
required for the reaction force command to evaluate the re-
quest for reaction forces, make the decision to react, and
allocate and load the reaction force into some motive device
(helicopters, trucks, armored personnel carriers, etc.).
Let t be the time required for the motive device to move the
m ^
reaction force to the vicinity of the ambush site. Let t* e
be the time required for the reaction force to close with and
engage the guerrilla force. With the exception of t all the
time intervals mentioned above are independent of range from
reaction force base to ambush site and may be considered as
constant. These time intervals will be combined in one term,
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t,, which may be called loading time. Thus
tH - t
' + t , + t (22)d c ed e
and the reaction time of the reaction force, t , is given by
S3
fc - t , + t (23)
s d m
The time required to move the reaction force to the vicinity
of the ambush site is given by
m v
r
where r is the distance from the reaction force base to the





+ £- . (25)
It can be seen from the above considerations that, for
some values of the distance, r, from the reaction force base
to the ambush site, slower motive devices may not meet the
requirement that the reaction time of the reaction force be
less than the target life.
The presence of an escort force accompanying a convoy
helps to extend the target life to such a point that a reac-
tion force can meet the requirement that it arrives prior to
guerrilla withdrawal.
We may consider the convoy and escort force as an ambush
target moving along a road. When the convoy is ambushed the
guerrilla force in turn forms a target for the reaction force.
This reaction force target has an associated target life which
depends on escort force size and guerrilla force size, among
other things. The target life may tie thought of as defining
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a region around tne convoy. A reaction force with a reaction
time shorter than the target life of the convoy could be ex-
pected to arrive at the ambush site prior to guerrilla with-
drawal. The region around each convoy defined above would
expand and contract as the guerrilla force size and escort
force size changed.
Looking at the same situation from the point of view of
the reaction force at its base, there is a reaction-feasible
region around the reaction force base which is defined as that
region inside which a convoy and escort force could, if am-
bushed, expect the arrival of the reaction force prior to the
withdrawal of the guerrilla force. The boundary of the region
is defined by the condition that the target life be equal to
the time performance of the reaction force. If there were
many convoys and escort forces which depended on the one reac-
tion force the reaction feasible region boundary would be de-
fined by the shortest target life of all of the convoys and
escort forces.
In general, the distance from the reaction force base
to the boundary of the reaction feasible region may be derived
as follows. The target life of the convoy and escort force,
t , is a function of the initial escort force size, E Q , and










Using equation (25) and letting r = R on the boundary of the
reaction feasible region, the time performance of the reaction
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force, t , is given by
t = t , + — . (27)
s d v
r
On the boundary of the region, t = t . Therefore equating
S X/




- td ] vr (28)
Equation (28) defines the distance to the boundary of the
reaction feasible region, or the maximum range at which an
ambush can occur and have the reaction force arrive prior to
guerrilla withdrawal.
In the case of a truck-borne reaction force the expres-
sion for the maximum range in equation (2 8) is defined in
terms of road miles traveled by the reaction force. For a
helicopter-borne reaction force the maximum range of the
boundary of the reaction feasible region is defined in terms
of air miles from the reaction base. The difference in maxi-
mum range between a helicopter-borne and truck-borne reaction
force may be even more pronounced if the speed at which trucks
can move on different roads varies considerably.
As an example, we can compare a helicopter-borne reaction
force's reaction feasible region to that of a truck-borne
reaction force over several roads extending from a reaction
base as shown in Figure 4. The maximum range at which an am-
bush can occur when a helicopter-borne reaction force is used
is given by equation (28) . Assuming a helicopter velocity of
90 mph, loading time zero, and a target life of 30 minutes,
the boundary of the reaction feasible region for a helicopter-
borne reaction force, RH , is given by
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-. 90 miles per hour
R„ = 30 minutes xr JU uu.«uuo» * 60 minutes per hour
= 45 miles. (29)
Assuming a truck convoy can move 45 miles per hour on route
I, 30 miles per hour on route J, and 20 miles per hour on
route K; the reaction feasible regions along each route
respectively for a truck-borne reaction force, R™,, Rrp-r' rtk'
are 22.5 road miles, 15 road miles, and 10 road miles. The
term road miles is emphasized here because an ambush may
occur inside the reaction feasible region measured radially
from the reaction base and be outside the reaction feasible
region if measured along tne alignment of the road. However,
for simplicity in the model, all roads are assumed to extend
radially from the reaction force base in a straight line.
In the manner outlined above the reaction feasible re-
gion may be compared for each motive device under considera-
tion. Here we are only considering trucks and helicopters.
Trucks are considered rather than more expensive and versatile
off-road surface transport systems because the ambush of con-
voys can occur only on roads. For this reason the requirement
for off-road mobility may be relaxed in favor of higher on-
road speeds. The helicopter is considered as the primary
airborne motive device because it is the most efficient air-
borne motive device over the ranges and payloads considered
here.
It can be seen that there are three major factors which
influence the mobility requirement for the reaction force and
determine the reaction feasible region. These factors are
40
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the loading time of the reaction force, the speed with which
the reaction force can move to the ambush site, and the lenqth
of time that the escort force can defend the convoy. Consider
the speed with which the reaction force can move to the am-
bush site. For a fixed initial escort, guerrilla, and reac-
tion force size and a fixed loading time, a greater reaction
force speed would allow either the reaction feasible region
to be enlarged or the size of the escort force to be reduced.
The same effect would result from a decrease in the loading
time of the reaction force. Alternatively, consider the
length of time that the guerrilla force can defend the convoy.
For a fixed initial guerrilla and reaction force size and
fixed reaction force loading time and speed, a larger escort
force size would extend the length of time that the escort
force could defend the convoy and would allow either a larger




THE ESCORT AND REACTION FORCE UTILIZATION MODEL
In the previous chapter the mobility requirement for
reaction forces was developed. The reaction feasible region
was defined as that region inside which a convoy and escort
force, if ambushed, could expect the arrival of the reaction
force prior to defeat or guerrilla withdrawal. In this chap-
ter a measure of the utilization of the escort and reaction
force will be developed with the aid of a queueing model.
Utilization of the escort and reaction force is defined as a
measure of how busy the reaction force is, and how many con-
voys and convoy routes one reaction force can cover before
reaching an unacceptable probability of being unable to re-
spond to an ambush. The escort force utilization is measured
indirectly. The escort force size determines in part the
reaction feasible region by determining the target life of
the convoy, if ambushed. The queueing model will use as in-
puts the reaction feasible region and the total ambush time-
reaction time relationship.
Queueing theory and models of queues attempt to mathe-
matically describe the behavior of systems that provide ser-
vice for randomly arriving demands. These models relate a
probabilistic knowledge of the irregularities in the system
to the congestion which occurs in the system due to the
irregularities. There are two essential elements in a
queueing system; a flow of customers requiring service, and
some restriction on the service that can be provided. The
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arrival of theater-goers at the box office to purchase tickets
is an example of a flow of customers requiring service. The
fact that there may be only one ticket seller at the box office
is a restriction to the service being provided. Keeping in
mind the essential elements of any queueing system a queueing
model will be developed to measure escort and reaction force
utilization. <
Consider the ambush and reaction force situation developed
in earlier chapters. Convoys are moving along a road network
in a hostile environment and a reaction force is on call to
assist the escort force accompanying the convoy in defeating
any ambush that may occur. The event, the ambush of a convoy,
may be considered as an arrival of a customer requiring ser-
vice. The fact that one reaction force will be available to
assist several convoys constitutes a restriction to the ser-
vice provided.
Probability Distribution of Arrivals
In order to model the arrival of requests for the reac-
tion force, several assumptions and simplifications must be
made concerning the convoys moving on the road network. Con-
voys usually arrive and depart from some logistic base and
move from one logistic base to a series of lesser logistic
bases distributing supplies and equipment. Since the convoy
primarily moves supplies used by the fighting forces it will
be assumed that these logistic base areas are co-located with
infantry units which could act as reaction forces.
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Most convoys move over road networks rather than cross-
country. Road networks usually follow the path of least re-
sistance from point to point and attempt to follow the short-
est distance between two points. For the purposes of the
model it will be assumed that convoy routes extend radially
out from the base area like spokes from the hub of a wheel.
It will be convenient to assume that convoys move in a straight
line from the base area to the boundary of the reaction fea-
sible region. Once the convoy reaches the boundary of the
reaction feasible region it is no longer of interest in the
model since it has passed the area of responsibility of the
reaction force. The reaction force will also be assumed to
move radially from the reaction base to the ambush site.
The demand for supplies will be assumed to be such that
the time between successive departures and successive arriv-
als of convoys along route i are exponentially distributed
random variables with parameter X . for departures and X ! forr l 1
arrivals. The number of departures and the number of arriv-
als along route 1 in the time interval from to t are then
Poisson distributed random variables with mean rates X . and
l
X! . Assuming independence among convoy departures and con-
voy arrivals along the same route, and independence among
routes, the different routes may be combined to describe the
departures and arrivals of all convoys from and to the reac-
tion force base. The probability law governing the distribu-
tion of time between successive departures or arrivals at the





where m is the number of routes. As before, the number of
departures and arrivals along all of the routes in the time
interval from to t is a Poisson distributed random variable
with mean rate
m
J (A. + A!) .1=1
Each convoy is exposed to the threat of ambush as it
moves from its point of departure to the boundary of the reac-
tion feasible region or vice versa. It is reasonable to as-
sume that the probability of a convoy being ambushed is a
function of the length of time that the convoy is exposed.
Thus the conditional probability, p, that a convoy is ambushed
between the reaction force base and the boundary of the reac-
tion feasible region regardless of which direction it is trav-
eling, given that a convoy is moving on the route, may be
given by
p=aR, 0<a<i- (30)
where a is a measure of the intensity of the threat of ambush
and R is the distance between the departure point and the
boundary of the reaction feasible region. If the boundary of
the reaction feasible region is a different distance from the
reaction force base for each route the worst case should be
assumed for all of the routes and the lowest value of R as-
signed to each route. This event would occur only with a
truck-borne reaction force since a helicopter-borne reaction
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force moves with the same speed regardless of the direction
in which it is traveling.
An important property of the Poisson process is that its
properties are preserved under random selection. This means
that if each event in a Poisson process with mean rate y is
counted with probability q, then the events which are counted
I
are still a Poisson process with mean rate yq. [15] Therefore,
if each convoy arriving or departing the reaction force base
has a probability p of being ambushed and the arrivals and
departures constitute a Poisson process, then the arrivals of
the event, the ambush of a convoy somewhere between the reac-
tion force base and the boundary of the reaction feasible
region, is also a Poisson process with mean rate
m
I U, + XMp .
i=l x ±
It can be shown that the rate of ambush arrivals is re-
lated to the average number of convoys on the road. The
distribution of the distance between each of the convoys if
they were all traveling on the same road in the same direction
may be derived from the time-distance relation
r = v t (31)
relating distance traveled, r, to velocity, v, and time trav-
eled, t. By assuming an average velocity, v , for all convoys
in the area of interest, the distribution of the distance be-
tween successive convoys is derived as follows. The distribu-
tion of time between successive departures and arrivals is ex-
ponential with parameter
m





Using the time distance relation, equation (31), the trans-
formation from time to distance may be made on the probabil-
ity distribution for time between successive convoys and
gives the result that the distribution of distance between
convoys is also exponential with parameter
m X . + X ! .
y Li h)
1=1 c
The mean distance between all of the convoys in range at any
time is the mean of the distribution of distance between
convoys




The mean number of convoys in the reaction feasible region
at any time, N, is given by the total distance, R, from the
reaction base to the boundary of the region, divided by the
mean distance between convoys. That is
N = R (^ iJ (32)
1=1 c
Probability Distribution of Service Time
The second essential element of a queueing system is some
restriction on the service that can be provided. The restric-
tion in this case is the fact that there is assumed to be only
one reaction force which responds to requests for assistance.
The length of time the reaction force is serving a request,
and therefore not at its base, will depend on many things. It
is assumed that the reaction force must return to the reaction
force base prior to being available for response to another
call. This assumption allows the consideration of range from
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the reaction base only, since the reaction force moves back
to the base before departing for the next ambush. This rules
out the possibility of the reaction force moving directly from
one ambush to the next. The assumption is reasonable since
the reaction force would be expected to replace casualties
and supplies prior to entering another battle. The foregoing
assumptions are made for convenience. The assumptions may be
relaxed somewhat and retain a solution to the model but compu-
tations may be more difficult.
The ambush model presented in Chapter 3 may be used to
evaluate the elapsed time between the beginning of the ambush
and the end of the ambush. The total ambush time does not
include the amount of time required for the reaction force to
return to its base. This time must be included in the ser-
vice time.
As developed in Chapter 4, the time required for the
reaction force to arrive at the ambush, t , is related to
distance, r, by equation (27)
t = t , + - , (27)
s d v
r
where v is the velocity of the motive device and r is the
distance from the reaction force base to the ambush site.
It is very likely that the motive device which transported
the reaction force to the ambush site would not remain in the
vicinity but would return to the reaction force base to be
used for other purposes. Then another motive device, probably
of the same type, would be dispatched to return the reaction
force to the base. Therefore, the time required to return
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the reaction force to its base is given by
V- §£ + td (33)
r
The service time is given by the sum of the total ambush
time and the time to return the reaction force to base. Total
ambush time is a function of escort force size, E, reaction
force size, RF, guerrilla force size, G, and the reaction
force time performance, t , among otner things. Therefore
total ambush time, TAT, may be expressed as a function,




If we consider only the effect of changes in the reaction
force time performance on total ambush time, the expression
for total ambush time becomes
TAT = f(t ) (35)
S3
If the functional relationship between total ambush time and
reaction time in equation (35) is assumed to be linear, then
TAT =f(t)=bt+c (36)
s s
where b and c are constants of the linear function. Sub-
stituting the expression for the reaction time given in equa-
tion (27) gives




From the definition of service time given earlier,
S = TAT + t , (38)
r
'
where S is service time. Substituting equations (33) and
(37) into equation (38) gives








S = (b + 2)— + (b + 1) t , + c . (39)
v d
r
Since the service time relationship given above is linear
in r, let




c' = (b + 1) td + c , (41)
which gives
S = b'r + c' . (42)
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, guerrillas are unpre-
dictable in the selection of ambush sites to avoid producing
a pattern. Thus every point along a road becomes a possible
ambush site and every point along the road may be assumed
equally likely to be an ambush site. The probability dis-
tribution which describes this situation is the uniform dis-
tribution, with probability density function
fA (r)
-
i, £ r < R . (43)
Transforming the expression for service time given in equa-
tion (42) into a probability distribution using the distribu-
tion of ambushes in range given by equation (4 3) gives the
following result.
S = b'r + c'
P(S<s) = P(b'r+c'^s) = P(r_<~^-) = FA (^r~>





The mean of the service time distribution, E[S], is calculated
as follows.
b'R+c 1





= ^ + c' (45)
The Queueing Model
Using the expressions developed for the arrival distribu-
tion, the probability that the reaction force is idle, busy,
or busy while one or more additional ambushes occur may be
calculated. An unacceptably large value for the probability
that the reaction force is busy while additional ambushes
occur might justify the requirement that two reaction forces
be placed on call, or a motive device with a higher velocity
be used in transporting the reaction force to the ambush
site.
The probabilities mentioned above are computed by eval-
uating the probability generating function, p(z), for the
system size in steady state derived from the arrival distribu-
tion and the service distribution. This derivation may be
found in most text books on queueing theory for a queueing
system with Poisson arrivals and general service time dis-
tribution. [4] The probability generating function, P(z),
D/ > (1-p) (l-z)b*(a(l-z)) >.,.\P(z) = b*Ml-z))-z (46)
where a is the rate of arrival of calls defined as the recip-
rocal of the mean of the arrival distribution; p is defined
as the product of the arrival rate and the mean service time;
and b*(a(l-z)) is the Laplace transform of the service time
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distribution with argument a(l-z). The probability that the
reaction force is idle, p , busy, p, ; or busy while additional
ambushes occur, p~ , is computed from the probability generat-
ing function by
1 d _ .
v
pk





That is, the probability that the system is in state k is
given by the kth derivative with respect to z of the probabil-
ity generating function evaluated at z = , divided by k fac-
torial.
These state probabilities correspond to the probabilities
that there are 0, 1, 2,...,k customers in the queue, including
the customer being served,
The Laplace transform of the service time distribution is
computed from the general definition of the Laplace transform:
00
f*(s) = / e" stf(t)dt (48)
for values of s for which the integral exists. In the case
of the service time distribution defined by equation (44)
,
the Laplace transform of the service time density function is
b'R+c' .





iexp[-s(b'R+c') ] - exp[-sc']}. (49)
Substituting s = a(l - z)
,
b*(a(l-z)) = -





To evaluate the probability generating function it will
be necessary to expand the exponential function in a series.
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By expanding the exponential function in a series the ex-
pression for b*(a(l-z)) can be simplified considerably. In
addition, since we are only interested in p Q , p. , and p ? de-
fined above, sufficient accuracy can be achieved by using
the first five terms of the series expansion. If this is done
the probability generating function becomes
2 3
(1-p) [l-^r (l-z)A+^T (l-z)^B-5T (l-z)
J
C]




where A = b 'R + c 1
,




C = (b'R) 3 + 4(b*R) 2 c' + 6b'R(c') 2 + 4(c') 3 .
The probability that the reaction force is idle at any
time, p Q , is given by
p = p(0) = 1 - p (52)
where
h'R £
p = (HJi + c') I (A. + A!) p . (53)z i=l 1 1
The probability that the reaction force is busy at any time,
pl dz~






Z = ° 1_a A +a R-2L-T
21 31 TT~
The probability that the reaction force is busy while addi-
tional ambushes occur, p~ , is given by
p 2
= 1
~ p " p l (55)
Additional information may be computed from the queueing
model described above, such as the expected number of ambushes
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in the system at any time, and the queue size distribution,
but these relations have little meaning since we are only
considering a queue whose maximum length is one.
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CHAPTER VI
APPLICATION OF THE PLANNING MODEL
As developed in the previous chapters the planning model
consists of the convoy ambush model and the escort and reac-
tion force utilization model. Figure 5 shows the relation-
ship of the variables in the planning model and how they af-
fect the output of the model. Some numerical examples will
be presented to illustrate the type of information^ generated
by the model as well as to point out the more important
equations in the planning model.
Some of the variables which were considered in detail in
the development of the model are the initial escort-guerrilla
force ratio and the speed at which the reaction force can
arrive at the ambush site. It is recognized that no control
can be directly exercised over the size of the guerrilla
force. However, aggressive patrolling and other intelligence
should give some idea of the expected guerrilla threat. The
necessary escort force size to counter a given threat can be
determined based on the time delay of the reaction force.
The size of the escort force can be chosen to insure that
the reaction force could arrive before the escort force was
annihilated. A graph similar to Figure 2 could be used to
make the escort force size decision.
For example, suppose a reaction force was assigned the
responsibility of being available to assist convoys within a
radial distance of 37.5 miles from the reaction force base.
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of transport available; helicopters with a 1.5 mile per min-
ute speed and a 10 minute loading time, or trucks with a 0.5
mile per minute speed and a 10 minute loading time. Then,
using equation (28) , the escort force would have to defend
itself for 35 minutes in the case of the helicopter-borne
reaction force and 85 minutes in the case of the truck-borne
reaction force assuming that the ambush occurred on the
boundary of the area of responsibility. This would require
an initial escort-guerrilla force ratio, from Figure 2, of
1.34 in the first case and 1.45 in the second case. In the
case of the truck-borne reaction force, the escort force would
come very close to winning the engagement without the help of
the reaction force. The advantage of a helicopter-borne reac-
tion force is in allowing a smaller escort force size with
each convoy. This economy of forces in the escort of convoys
will be even greater if a larger number of convoys and escort
forces are the responsibility of one reaction force.
As an example of how the escort and reaction force util-
ization may be calculated consider the same example as given
in the previous paragraph with a helicopter-borne reaction
force. In addition a specific threat of ambush by a guer-
rilla force of 50 riflemen and an available total friendly
force of 100 riflemen to defend one convoy is assumed. In
this case the curve in Figure 1 for an initial escort-
reaction force ratio of 2.0 is appropriate since it is the
lowest ratio which will allow the reaction force to arrive
prior to escort force annihilation if the convoy is ambushed
at 37.5 miles from the reaction force base. This selection
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agrees with the decision made on the escort-guerrilla force
ratio in the previous example.
To derive the service time distribution, a least squares
linear approximation of the total ambush time-reaction time
relationship expressed by the second curve in Figure 1 may
be made using those values equal to or greater than 10 min-
utes reaction time. The first 10 minutes are excluded be-
cause the reaction force does not move toward the ambush in
that time interval and a transformation was made from time
to distance using the total ambush time-reaction time relation-
ship when the escort and reaction force utilization equations
were derived. The linear approximation is
TAT = 0.82 8 t +8.12 minutes
S (56)
for 10 < t < 35 minutes
— s —
or in agreement with the notation in Chapter 5,
b = 0.828, c = 8.12.
Using equation (39), service time is related to the range
from the ambush site to reaction force base by the equation
S = (b + 2)— + (b + l)t, + c
v d
r
S = (0.828 + 2)£-=- + (0.828 + 1) (10) + 8.12
1 . D
S = 1.88 r + 26.4 minutes. (57)
A check can be made of the derived service time equation
by comparing the answer computed from the equation at extreme
values of range with intuition. If the ambush occurred with-
in one mile of the reaction force base such that the term
containing r could be ignored in equation (57) the service
time would be given by the length of time the ambush battle
59
would take, (0.828) (10) + 8.12 = 16.4 minutes, which accounts
for the 10 minute loading time delay of the reaction force
plus the loading time for the reaction force to return to
base, 10 minutes. At the maximum range of 37.5 miles the
service time is 97 minutes. The mean service time E[S] is
given by equation (45) and in this case is 61.7 minutes.
The computation of the parameter of the arrival distribu-
tion follows immediately from the derivation in Chapter 3.
If we assume that on tne average one convov per da~y arrives
and one convoy per day departs on each of m routes, then the
parameter of the arrival distribution of convoys is
m
I (X. + X!) = 2 m per day. (5 8)
i=l
If we also assume that convoys only move during daylight hours
Dm
the parameter becomes yjn" Per minute. The rate of arrivals
of ambushes, a, as defined in the previous chapter, is
a = 790 per minute (59)
where p is the probability of ambush anywhere in the area of
interest.
To evaluate the escort and reaction force utilization
the expression b 1 and c* must be evaluated (equations 40, 41)
as well as p . That is





c' = (b + l)td + c = (1.828) (10) + 8.12
= 2 6.4 minutes, and
p = E[S]a = (^— + C) ^H = 0.1715 m p. (60)
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The probability that the reaction force is idle is given by
equation (52)
,
p =l-p=l- 0.1715 m p. (61)





(1 - p) L ((. ,Pi 1 - L (62)
2 3
L= 2T A -3T B+ 4T C (63)
A = b'R + c 1
,
B = (b'R) 2 + 3b' Re' + 3(c') 2
,
C = (b'R) 3 + 4(b'R) 2 c' + 6b'R(c') 2 + 4(c') 3 .
Substituting in the values for b', c', R, and a
;
L = 0.1348 mp - 0.0163(mp) 2 + . 001115 (mp) 3 (64)
m (1 - 0.1715mp)L (65)
and
"'1 1 - L
If the reaction force is available to assist convoys on 5






which means the reaction force is idle 82.85% of the time,
busy 11.25% of the time and busy while additional ambushes










which means the probability that the reaction force is busy
while additional ambushes occur is almost as great as the
probability that the reaction force is busy and no additional
ambushes occur. Saying the same thing in a slightly different
way, 4 8% of the times when the reaction force is busy an
additional ambush or ambushes will occur.
If a truck-borne reaction force was considered for the
same conditions as the previous example the number of rifle-
men engaged in escorting the convoy is 72 per convoy as
opposed to the 67 men per convoy required if a helicopter-
borne reaction force is used. On the average 10 convoys per
day arrive at and depart from the reaction feasible region.
Therefore the use of a helicopter-borne reaction force re-





It has been shown that the escort and reaction force
relationship in the route security problem can be modeled.
It is felt that the equations representing the convoy ambush
and subsequent arrival of the reaction force contain enough
variables to allow a realistic portrayal of most convoy am-
bush situations. Supporting weapons fire such as artillery,
mortar, or close air support can be included easily in the
equations. [19] Another possible generalization could be
made which would divide the escort force into two parts,
those in the killing zone and those outside the zone. In
this case those escort forces outside the killing zone could
be represented by Schaffer's skirmish equations in the same
manner as the reaction force is modeled. The reaction force
could also have a certain probability of being ambushed as
it came to the assistance of the escort force or, as is sug-
gested for the escort force, a certain percentage of the
reaction force could be ambushed. Each of the generaliza-
tions to the convoy ambush model would have to be carefully
examined to insure that the added realism and accuracy repre-
sented by the generalization was worth the cost of additional
variables to be evaluated and the additional complexity of
the solution.
Some possible generalizations to the utilization portion
of the model include allowing a different probability distribu-
tion of ambushes in range. The Beta distribution is an
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obvious choice since it is a generalization of the uniform
distribution and may be skewed, or weighted, by appropriate
selection of parameters to reflect changes in the probable
location of ambushes. The selection of distributions is
limited to those which have a finite range of possible values.
A limitation of any probability distribution is the fact that
all distributions are unimodal. It is very possible that
many very probable locations of ambush sites may exist along
any given route which could not be adequately represented by
a probability distribution. It is felt that the Beta dis-
tribution would give adequate results in the majority of sit-
uations where the uniform could not be assumed.
The assumption of a linear relationship between total
ambush time and reaction time used in the derivation of the
service time distribution could be relaxed to allow a quad-
ratic or higher order functional relationship. In some cases,
as can be seen in Figure 8, the linear assumption will not
hold. The non-linear relationsnip seems to exist only at
total friendly force-guerrilla force ratios that are marginal
at best, that is, those ratios which fall on the extreme low-
er or left hand portion of the shaded area in Figure 3. Thus
it is felt that the linear assumption is a reasonable one for
more reasonable force ratios. In addition the probability
distribution transformation needed to derive the service time
distribution is very complicated for a general quadratic or
higher form of the total ambush time-reaction time relation-
ship.
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The general derivation of the queueing model used to
measure the escort and reaction force utilization depends on
the assumption of Poisson arrivals of requests for the reac-
tion force and independence of departures of convoys along
different routes. Without these assumptions the derivation
of the queueing model is not feasible.
A generalization of the arrival distribution which does
not change the Poisson arrival assumption is possible. This
change is to allow a different value for each route of the
probability that convoys are ambushed along that route. The
parameter of the exponential distribution of interarrival
times would then become
m
I (A. + X!) p. .,1 1*11=1
This change would be extremely easy to incorporate as all
equations derived would remain essentially the same.
Again it should be emphasized that generalizations of
the model without justification from collected data do not
necessarily result in a better model. Every parameter of the
model should be estimated and in some manner verified in order
to assure an adequate representation of the situation modeled.
The values for the parameters of tne model used in this thesis
are arbitrary and in most cases were chosen to agree with
those assumed by Schaffer. They should not be construed to
be representative of actual combat situations.
The planning model could be used as a basic effective-
ness model in a cost-effectiveness study of the manpower
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allocation problem associated with route security. The model
could also be used to justify the procurement of better mo-
tive devices to support the requirements for route security.
Other uses for the model include evaluation of command de-
cisions in a war game of the route security problem.
The model could be used to determine the size of the
area of responsibility of the reaction force which would re-
quire an airborne alert of the reaction force to adequately
cover the area of responsibility. It is probable "that the
decision to use airborne reaction forces would be necessary
only if the size of the area of responsibility were large.
A high probability of ambush or many routes to cover in a
moderate sized area of responsibility would more likely re-
quire additional ground alert reaction forces since the
availability of a reaction force would be a controlling fac-
tor rather than limitation on size of the escort force as
would be the case with a large area of responsibility.
Among the areas for further research suggested by the
model is the determination of appropriate values for the
parameters of the model to accurately simulate the results
of actual ambushes. The determination of parameter values
might also suggest generalizations such as were mentioned
earlier to improve the accuracy and validity of the model.
The expected guerrilla firepower and force size, the distribu-
tion of ambush sites along roads, the areas of responsibility
and number of routes in the area as well as the parameters
of the distribution of convoy arrivals and departures are all
areas in which valuable research could be conducted. With
66
estimates for the parameters of the model taken from actual
ambushes the model could be used to develop decision criteria
for field commanders who are responsible for route security.
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COMPUTER PROGRAM USED TO SOLVE THE AMBUSH EQUATIONS
This computer program was written in the FORTRAN IV
language for the IBM 360 series computer. Comment cards
have been used where necessary to explain the program.
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APPENDIX B
GRAPHS OF TOTAL AMBUSH TIME VS. REACTION TIME
Some additional curves which were generated during the
preparation of this thesis are included in Figures 6, 7 , and
8. Figure 6 can be compared to Figure 1 because they both
represent initial total friendly-guerrilla force ratios of
2.0 and escort-reaction force ratios of 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, and
4.0. Figures 7 and 8 show the effect of decreasing the
initial total friendly force-guerrilla force ratio while
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